COMMON RITUAL KNOWLEDGE
Joshua Cockayne

How can participating in a liturgy allow us to know God? Recent pathbreaking work on the epistemology of liturgy has argued that liturgy allows
individuals to gain ritual knowledge of God by coming to know-how to
engage God. However, since liturgy (as it is ordinarily practiced) is a group
act, I argue that we need to give an account to explain how a group can know
God by engaging with liturgy. If group know-how is reducible to instances of
individual know-how, then the existing accounts are sufficient for explaining
a group’s knowing-how to engage God. However, I argue, there are good
reasons to suppose that reductive accounts of group know-how fail. In this
paper, I propose a non-reductive account of common ritual knowledge, according to which the group knows-how to engage God in liturgy.

Introduction
One of the most powerful moments in the Church of England’s Eucharistic
liturgy occurs as the priest reads the words of the Collect (a short prayer
usually used after confession and before the Liturgy of the Word) over
the congregation.1 In this moment, the congregation moves from being
a collection of individuals, each with their own worries, concerns and
questions, to becoming a unified community, a community that worships
God together. This change is not unique to Anglican services, or even to
traditions which use only formal written liturgy, either. As Stanley Hauerwas describes, the act of gathering “indicates that Christians are called
from the world, from their homes, from their families, to be constituted
into a community capable of praising God.”2 The very act of gathering
together as a community signifies the importantly communal dimension
of Christian worship and the change that takes place when we worship
together. This paper seeks to take seriously the theological significance of

1
As Paul Bradshaw notes in the companion to the Church of England’s Common Worship,
in using the collect, “the ministry of the president serves to unify the liturgy and draw the
community into a worshipping community” (Companion to Common Worship, 114).
2
Hauerwas, In Good Company, 157. This emphasis on the Church’s gathering from a
variety of spheres of society is discussed in detail by Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 159–166.
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the communal dimension of Christian worship and to offer a social epistemology of liturgy (however formal or informal it may be) in light of this.3
To give a social epistemology of liturgy, I begin by first considering
how liturgy can allow us to know God. As Terence Cuneo has argued,
our participation in the liturgy of the Church plays an important role in a
Christian way of life which is “dedicated to engaging God in various ways
by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.”4 As he
goes on to suggest, engaging God in this way allows us to gain a kind of
“ritual knowledge,” which consists in knowing-how to engage God by
means of participating in the repeated acts of blessing, petitioning, and
thanking God.5
As I will argue, whilst Cuneo’s position seems entirely plausible, since
the emphasis is placed only on what an individual can know, his account
stops short of providing a social epistemology of liturgy.6 To give a social
epistemology of liturgy we need an account of what it is for a group to
know-how to engage God. If group know-how is reducible to individual
know-how, then Cuneo’s account will suffice. However, by building on
recent work on group know-how,7 I argue that there are good reasons to
suppose that group know-how is irreducible to individual know-how.
Lastly, to give an account of how a church can know-how to engage God
in liturgy, I apply Deborah P. Tollefsen and S. Orestis Palermos’s account
of group know-how to the context of liturgy.8
Ritual Knowledge
Let us begin by considering what has already been said on the epistemology of liturgy. As James K. A. Smith notes, in recent years, there has
been something of a “liturgical turn” in the philosophy of religion.9 Philosophers of religion are beginning to take note of the importance of the
practices of religion, and not just the importance of religious doctrine or
religious belief. For instance, as Sarah Coakley suggests, liturgy can provide us with a kind of knowledge-by-acquaintance.10 Through repeated
practices, we are able to slowly come to see the world differently and are
able to develop relationships with God, “found in trust and sustained

I use “liturgy” in a broad sense to denote any scripted communal worship.

3

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 148.

4

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163.

5

We can distinguish between at least two kinds of groups in reference to the Church. The
Church as a whole is constituted by globally and historically distant gathered churches who
are united together by the work of the Holy Spirit. Within this group, we can also describe
the worship of a gathered church as a group action which individuals participate in.
6

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How.”

7

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How.”

8

Smith, “Review of Ritualized Faith,” 118. For a more detailed summary of the recent literature on liturgy and epistemology see Cockayne, “Philosophy and Liturgy Part 2.”
9

10

Coakley, “Beyond Belief.”
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by repeated acts of adoration and worship.”11 According to Nicholas
Wolterstorff, liturgy provides a kind of object-knowledge of God through
the repetition of certain forms of address. By taking for granted that God
is a certain way by addressing him in worship, Wolterstorff thinks, participants in a liturgy can come to know what God is like.12
One of the most influential of these accounts of liturgical epistemology
is Cuneo’s account of “ritual knowledge.” Cuneo argues that one of the
roles of liturgical worship is to provide participants with a certain kind
of practical knowledge of how to engage God which cannot be reduced
to propositional knowledge about God; he calls this “ritual knowledge.”13
Just as knowing another person involves developing a “rapport” with that
person in which we come to know-how to engage that person,14 Cuneo
maintains that “knowing God consists in (although is not exhausted by)
knowing how to engage God.”15 Liturgy provides an important means
of gaining this kind of ritual knowledge. Filling this account out, Cuneo
writes,
[L]iturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting,
kissing, prostrating, and eating that count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. . . . If this is
correct, the liturgy provides the materials for not only engaging but also
knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: the liturgy provides the
materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a context in
which she can exercise or enact it . . . to the extent that one grasps and sufficiently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition,
and thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.16

On this proposal, it is not that certain bodily acts merely accompany certain
speech-acts, but, rather, “in the context of the liturgy, kissing, prostrating,
and eating also count as cases of engaging God by blessing, petitioning,
and thanking God.”17
11

Coakley, “Beyond Belief,” 340.

12

Wolterstorff, “Knowing God Liturgically,” 14–15.

13

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 162.

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 148–49. This claim is also confirmed by those discussing the philosophy of personal knowledge, more generally. Bonnie M. Talbert, for instance, argues that
to know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over time.
Knowing how to interact with a particular person starts with the largely ineffable
ability to recognize him/her, which recognition comes to be associated with a more
complex mental representation of that individual. . . . Our interactive skills are
largely intuitive and difficult to express in propositional terms. For example, when
I am talking to Shannon, I find that I pace my remarks differently than I do when I
am talking to Deme. Without thinking about it I seem to adjust the pace of my conversation to what I somehow perceive is most suitable to the interaction. (Talbert,
“Knowing Other People,” 196–197)
14

15

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 149.

16

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163.

Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 156. Cuneo attempts to stay relatively neutral on the disagreement
between intellectualism (the thesis that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that)
and anti-intellectualism (the thesis that it is not the case that all knowing-how is a species of
17
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Whilst Cuneo’s account is both intuitive and insightful, as I will argue,
it does not provide an account of what it is for a church to know-how
to engage God, but only of what it is for an individual to know-how to
engage God. Thus, to take seriously the communal dimension of Christian
worship, we need to provide an account which explains a church’s
know-how, that is, we need an account not just of ritual knowledge, but
also of common ritual knowledge.
Common Worship
Having considered the connection between individual liturgical actions
and individual know-how, it will now be important to consider the importance of collective liturgical actions so that we can see their connection
to the group’s know-how. In this section, I will make a number of brief
observations about group liturgical action.
First, liturgy ordinarily requires acting together. As the twentieth-century
Anglo-Catholic writer Evelyn Underhill puts it,
Christian worship is never a solitary undertaking. Both on its visible and
invisible sides, it has a thoroughly social and organic character. The worshipper, however lonely in appearance, comes before God as a member of a
great family; part of the Communion of Saints, living and dead.18

Underhill later suggests that the outward forms of worship in the Church
visible should somehow reflect the unity of the Church invisible. Thus,
in order to provide a “here-and-now-embodiment” by which “man and
women can transcend the apparent isolation of the soul and unite in a
common act of worship,” Underhill suggests that the visible Church must
participate in a number of practices which allow this kind of unity of
action.19
Secondly, acting together requires some kind of coordination or plan.
In the liturgy, this is provided by means of a liturgical script, but the point
can be made more generally. As John Searle argues, there is an important
difference between actions which are done at the same time and actions
which are done together. Consider the following case, for instance:
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a
park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a
common, centrally located, shelter. Each person has the intention expressed
by the sentence “I am running to the shelter.” But for each person, we may
suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions
knowing that) by giving some considerations in favour of what he describes as a ‘moderate
view’ (Ritualized Faith, 151). As he describes this view, knowing-how is “a sequence of act
types that an agent can perform,” such as “[p]erforming a work of music, swimming the
crawl . . . and offer[ing] thanks to God” (Ritualized Faith, 151).
18
Underhill, Worship, 81. As Underhill stresses, the worship of the Church has both a visible and an invisible component. Both of these components are social in character. To think
about the actions of the Church invisible would require much more careful theological work
than there is space for. Here I focus only on the corporate actions of the Church visible.
19

Underhill, Worship, 93.
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and behavior of others. In this case, there is no collective behavior; there
is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a common
goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a
common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of
an outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to
converge on a common point. We can even imagine that the external bodily
movements are indistinguishable in the two cases; the people running for
shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. Externally observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly
different internally.20

Whilst philosophers have disagreed on just what the nature of such intentions are, they have generally agreed that there is a distinction to be made
between individual and collective intentionality. On Searle’s own analysis, “we-intentions” are an irreducible phenomenon of acting together
which require a kind of cooperation between individuals. In contrast to
this, Michael Bratman thinks that a collective intention is reducible to each
individual intending to act together, along with the belief that everyone
else also has a similar intention.21 Nevertheless, both have in common
that the intentions of individuals are different in cases of acting together.22
In relation to acting together in liturgy this is especially important. As
Wolterstorff puts this point, “scripts, in many cases, are very nearly indispensable for acting together.”23 Similarly, as Underhill maintains, the
kind of joint action involved in the worship of the Church, depends on our
having “an agreed pattern, a liturgy; even though this pattern be of the
simplest kind.”24
Thirdly, whilst a script is important for acting together, acting together
also requires going beyond a script. As Wolterstorff points out, the presence of a liturgical script cannot entirely capture what it is to act together.
For instance, he notes, “[i]f one person . . . says the creed very slowly
and another says it very quickly, they are not saying the creed together,”
despite the fact that both individuals are following the same script.25 The
reason for this, Wolterstorff states, is that
the script for enacting a particular liturgy is never fully specified by a
text, nor by a text supplemented by oral directives. Always some of the
20

John Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” 403–404.

21

Bratman, “Shared Agency,” 43–49.

Both Searle’s and Bratman’s analyses have also been applied to explain acting liturgically. For instance, Cuneo suggests that Searle’s analysis of collective action can be used to
explain the actions involved in liturgical singing (Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 138), and Wolterstorff suggests that reading a liturgical script together requires a kind of “interlocking” and
“meshing” of individual intentions in the way described by Bratman (Wolterstorff, Acting
Liturgically, 61). Just as the choreography of the corps de ballet is essential for forming the kind
of we-intentions required for performing a ballet together, the liturgical script (or at least
some agreed pattern of worship) is essential for being able to worship God together.
22

23

Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 15.

24

Underhill, Worship, 99.

25

Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 64.
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prescriptions constituting the script are embedded within the social practice
of that particular religious community for enacting its liturgies.26

This point is developed in more detailed by Bruce Ellis Benson, who thinks
of following liturgy not as following some orchestral score (as Wolterstorff
suggests),27 but, rather, as performing a piece of jazz.28 Even in the use
of repetitive, scripted liturgy, Benson suggests that each performance is
different from the last; he notes that “there is still a difference between one
repetition and another, in the same way that there is a difference between
one performance of a symphony and another.”29 As Benson explains, just
as jazz musicians must be well prepared and “know . . . how to respond to
the call of other improvisers,” the same must be the case for improvising
in liturgical contexts.30 Whilst following a script is important for acting
together, there must be some level of responsiveness to those one is acting
alongside, as well as a responsiveness to the norms which are implicit in a
community, but which cannot be made explicit in a liturgical script.
Finally, acting together requires uniting a set of disparate actors and
actions. Whilst it is important that a church worships together, this does
not mean that all ways of participating must be identical. For instance, in
his discussion of the epistemology of the rituals described in Scripture,
Dru Johnson writes that
not only is knowing a social process, but there is an intentional disparity
in the performance of rites, which means that by its constitution, the Torah
does not construct an egalitarian epistemology, where everyone has access
to the same knowledge—a caricatured ideal of rationalism. Rather, because
different roles in Israelite society will necessarily dispose persons to be variously discerning, they must rely upon each other in order to know well.31

As Johnson highlights, one of the remarkable aspects of Hebrew ritual
is that it is inclusive of children. This inclusivity exists not only for the
sake of the children, but also for the sake of those who participate alongside children and are led by children in worship.32 Moreover, we might
think, such inclusivity extends to thinking about the liturgy of the Church
today—as Benson observes, a worshipping community is composed of

26

Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 20.

27

Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 7.

28

Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41.

29

Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 141

30

Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41.

31

Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 246.

In recent work, I make a similar point with reference to participating in liturgy alongside those with Autism Spectrum Disorder. I suggest that an account of group liturgical
action cannot be defined only with reference to neuro-typical individuals, who can interlock
their intentions without difficulty, but it must also be inclusive of those who cannot form
we-intentions (Cockayne, “Inclusive Worship”).
32
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“multiple voices,”33 which do not always provide polyphony, which often
remain “distinct and sometimes dissonant.”34
Thus, not only is the liturgical worship of the visible Church communal,
scripted and partially improvised, but it also brings together difference to
be united.
From Acting Together to Knowing Together
We have now seen that liturgy can provide a means of knowing-how to
engage God via acts of blessing, petitioning and thanking God, and we
have also seen that liturgy can provide a means of acting together. Now, I
turn to consider the interaction between these two points.
As Johnson outlines, since Hebrew rituals are inherently social in nature,
the result is that “[i]n being disposed to know objects, constructs, or God
Himself, more than one person is required.”35 Similarly, as Wolterstorff
describes it, “liturgy is like music in that one acquires some particular
know-how by being inducted into a social practice for the exercise of this
know-how. There are others who possess the know-how in question; liturgical know-how is a shared know-how.”36 What remains to be seen,
however, is how best to analyse the nature of this shared know-how.
In this section, I begin by considering the possibility that group
know-how is reducible to instances of individual know-how. We might
think that, in talking of a church’s knowing-how to engage God by blessing,
petitioning and thanking God, we are only saying something about the
know-how of the individual members of that church. If this reductive
account is successful, then Cuneo’s account of ritual knowledge is easily
extendible to cases of church know-how. However, I argue that there are
good reasons to think that reductive accounts of group know-how are not
successful.
First, it is important to note that the phenomenon of a group
knowing-how to perform some action is not unique to the Church; we
talk of an orchestra’s knowing-how to play a piece of music, a scientific
research team knowing-how to perform experiments and a sports team
knowing-how to win games.37 In all of these cases, it appears that it is the
group which knows-how to perform various actions and not just the individuals—the violin player does not know-how to perform a symphony
any more than the percussion player. Yet, the orchestra does appear to
33

Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94.
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Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94.
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Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 245.

Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 7–8. Wolterstorff introduces this discussion of shared
know-how in The God We Worship but it is not developed into an account of group know-how.
The closest Wolterstorff gets to discussing group know-how is in his recent work on liturgy
in which he discusses the role of collective intentionality in acting together in liturgy (Acting
Liturgically, 61–65). The epistemological implications of this account of collective intentionality in liturgy are not discussed in detail by Wolterstorff.
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Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 112.
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know-how to perform the symphony. We often praise group performances
and award orchestras, football teams and companies for their group performances. This implies that, in some sense, the group is responsible for
acting in a certain way.
One natural way of understanding these claims, and, thereby, one way
of understanding a church’s know-how in corporate liturgy, is to reduce
instances of group know-how to instances of individual-know-how, or a
summation of individual-know-hows. Put simply, an account of group
know-how is reducible to individual know-how if all statements concerning group know-how are true in virtue of statements concerning
individual know-how.
As I will argue in this section, a reductive approach does not appear
promising. Whilst there is not space for a decisive refutation of the reductive approach here, I argue that attempting to reduce group know-how
to the know-how of the individuals involved leads to a number of counterintuitive consequences. Whilst it might be possible for defenders of
reductive accounts to simply bite the bullet and accept that how we ordinarily talk about group know-how is mistaken, at the very least, these
counterintuitive consequences provide the motivation for looking towards
an alternative, non-reductive account. Let us begin, then, by considering
two different reductive accounts of group know-how.
First, we might think that talk of group know-how is a “short-hand”
way of referring to the addition of the know-how of each specific individual member of a group.38 If it is possible to conceive of group-action
as a simple addition of many individual actions, then perhaps we can
think of group know-how as the addition of each individual instance of
know-how. As Palermos and Tollefsen suggest, a case which seems easy
to describe in these terms is that of a car production line, in which the
expertise is distributed in such a way that each individual performs her
own role, thereby allowing a car, say, a Chevrolet Corvette to be produced.
Thus, we might think, to say that the Corvette production line knows-how
to make Corvettes is simply to say that John the welder knows-how to
weld, Mary the painter knows-how to paint, and so on. On the additive
view, group know-how is identical with the summation of the know-how
of each specific member.39
However, in explaining what the Corvette production line knows by
referring only to an addition of the know-how of the individuals working
on this production line, we must admit that strictly speaking, “no one
knows-how to make a Corvette. Each individual in the company knows
their own domain but no person knows-how to do all the various things
that comprise making the Corvette . . . Corvettes are made but apparently

38

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 114–115.
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As Palermos and Tollefsen formalize the additive definition of group know-how:
‘A(KH) + B (KH) + C (KH) … = G–KH’ (“Group Know-How,” 116).
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no one knows-how to make them.”40 Additionally, although typically
credit is given to Chevrolet for the quality of their car production, on
an additive approach, “no one should be given credit because no one
knows-how to make a Corvette.”41 Even if we focus on individuals with
the most expertise in such a process, say, the production manager, or the
original designer of the car, it is highly unlikely that these individuals
know-how to make the car since they do not actually make the car themselves, at least not entirely. Moreover, focusing on the addition of specific
individuals also appears to run into further issues. For instance, if group
know-how is a summation of specific group members’ know-how, then we
would have to admit that “when Catherine takes a job at Honda, Corvette
no longer knows-how to make cars.”42 Thus, a straightforward additive
reduction appears problematic.
Secondly, then, if we want to make sense of the production line’s
know-how whilst avoiding these counterintuitive consequences, we might
consider a less specific account, which attributes group know-how to general roles rather than specific individuals. For instance, rather than think of
the production line’s group know-how as identical to John’s knowing-how
to weld and Mary’s knowing-how to paint, we might think that the production line’s know-how is identical with some individual’s knowing-how
to weld and some individual’s knowing-how to paint.43 What is important
for the production line is not Catherine or Mary or John, but, rather, the
roles that each of these individuals play in the production of the Corvette.
Thus, on this view “Corvette knows-how to make a car whenever there is
some person in the various positions that knows-how to do their job.”44
Whilst this view appears more promising, it also runs into problems.
On this account, when Chevrolet has a position open or loses an employee, they no longer know-how to make Corvettes. This might seem like
an obvious conclusion for some—if the machinery is running, all other
employees are present and willing to work, it still appears that the production line is no longer able to make Corvettes, so we should think that some
know-how has gone missing and that the production line ceases to have
know-how.45 However, this conclusion runs counter to how know-how
is usually thought of. When a person breaks her leg, she does not lose
the ability to run, and when we are asleep we do not lose our knowledge of how to ride bikes—know-how appears to be something we retain
even when we momentarily lack the capacity to engage in the relevant
40
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As they formalise this second position: ‘p(KH) + q(KH) + r (KH) … = G(KH) … where p,
q, r … represent some individual rather than any specific individual’ (“Group Know-How,”
116).
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activities. Whilst it is clearly possible to lose one’s know-how in certain
cases, momentarily being unable to ride a bike or to run does not mean
that one ceases to know-how to do these things. Analogously, Palermos
and Tollefsen suggest, “surely we would want to say that Corvette still
knows-how to make its famous cars, just as we would want to say that
someone with a broken leg still knows how to ride a bike.”46 Whilst it is
surely possible for Chevrolet to cease knowing-how to produce Corvettes
(we might say, for instance, “They just don’t know how to make cars like
they used to” after a period of sustained poor quality production), losing
this know-how as a result of momentarily having a vacancy would seem
to be a strange conclusion to draw for it would imply that Chevrolet has to
relearn how to make cars each time they gain a new employee. Yet on the
reductive account of group know-how outlined above, group know-how
is identical with the addition of the know-how of some individuals who
fill various roles within the production line—so if we wish to say Chevrolet still knows-how to make Corvettes when it has vacancies, we should
look elsewhere than some addition of its members’ know-how.
Whilst the move from a reductive account which focuses on specific
individuals to one which is presented more generally avoids us having to
say that the group’s know-how depends on some individual’s know-how,
it does appear to require that these roles are always filled for the group to
retain its know-how. On this position know-how appears to be lost very
easily in a way which does not appear to be the case in individual cases
of know-how.
At this point, the defender of the reductive account might simply
bite the bullet and admit that companies and production lines lose and
gain know-how much more easily than individuals. Whilst it is beyond
the scope of this paper to decisively reject all versions of the reductive
account of group know-how, it seems reasonable to think that the intuitions driving the objections above are enough to motivate an alternative
position. Moreover, although intuitions might vary on whether Corvette
retains its know-how when it has vacancies, and there may be ways of
rescuing the reductive account from these counter-examples, there are
more general problems with thinking about group know-how in additive
terms. As Palermos and Tollefsen note, whilst a straightforward addition
of individual know-how seems to capture something plausible about the
way in which group know-how functions on a production line, it appears
less plausible in cases where continuous interaction between group members takes place. For instance, in reflecting on the example of an American
football team’s acting together, they note that,
Players on offense need to know-how to do each of their particular jobs but
each of those jobs requires an ongoing interaction with others in the team.
The play is not a result of adding up discrete individual actions or individual know-how regarding these actions. . . . Rather, the play itself is constituted
46
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by the complex interactions of individuals on the team. The performance of
a symphony is similar in this respect. I may perform my musical instrument
very skilfully but the skilled performance of the New York Philharmonic requires more than my skilful contribution. My contribution needs to be integrated with others’ contributions in a way that produces a collective skilled
performance. This type of performance seems to emerge from the complex
interactions of individual members, rendering . . . [group know-how] irreducibly collective.47

Even if we add up what each individual knows-how to do in the context of
group action, we have yet to give an account of group know-how; we need
to explain how this know-how is integrated and combined to produce
group action. The point appears to be that whilst individual know-how is
clearly necessary for a group’s knowing-how in many cases, it is not sufficient.48 We also need to say something about the function and structure
of the group itself to make sense of attributions of know-how to it. The
non-reductive accounts of group know-how outlined in the next section
seek to show what else is needed for a group to know-how, above and
beyond the know-how of each individual member.
As I described in the previous section, liturgical action is in some sense
both scripted and improvised. That is, there is a kind of responsiveness
and mutual awareness that must take place for a group to worship God
together. The way in which individual intentions intertwine and mesh in
such situations is complex. If we want to retain the idea that a church
knows-how to engage God, then we should look beyond reductive accounts of group know-how. In the next section, I consider two such
accounts.
Group Know-how without Reduction
In this section, I outline two ways of thinking about group know-how
which are non-reductive, before applying these to the context of liturgical
worship. In the next section, I will suggest that both of these two accounts
capture something of what it is for a church to know-how to engage God,
and so the two accounts should be combined to give an account of common
ritual knowledge. To recap: to say that group know-how is non-reductive
is simply to say that it cannot be explained entirely with reference to the
know-how of each individual member of the group.
First, I will outline an intellectualist account of group know-how. On
this account, we can avoid giving a reductive account of group know-how
47

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 117.

As Palermos and Tollefsen highlight, the irreducibility of group know-how is also attested to by work in cognitive science. For instance, Cooke et al. note,
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by invoking some proposition, known by the group, which enables the
group to perform together. As such, the group’s knowing-how is not reducible only to what we can say about the know-how of each individual
group member—it also requires that the group knows some proposition
which provides a way of acting together. On such a proposal, as Palermos
and Tollefsen describe it, “[t]he individual members of the group may
know-how to perform their part, but their individual know-how depends
on and is guided by there being a jointly accepted overall way, W, which
is the way to perform the overall act of φ.”49
To see how this might be the case, let us consider an account of group
propositional knowledge. On Raimo Tuomela’s account, for instance, for
a group to believe some proposition is for the operative members (i.e.,
those in a position to make decisions on behalf of the group, such as CEOs,
managers and leadership teams) of that group to accept some proposition
as true, and for the non-operative members of the group to accept and to
be aware of the group’s belief. Tuomela’s account of belief is formalised as
follows:
(Belief of Group) G believes that p in the social and normative circumstances
C if and only if in C there are operative members A1 … Am in G with respective positions P1 … Pm such that
(1) the agents A1 … Am, when they are performing their social tasks in their
positions P1 … Pm, and due to their exercising the relevant authority system of G, (intentionally) jointly accept that p, and because of this exercise of authority system, they ought to continue to accept or positionally
believe it;
(2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the effect that
(1);
(3) because of (1) the (full-fledged and adequately informed) non-operative
members of G tend tacitly to accept—or at least ought to accept—p as
members of G; and
(4) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3).50

The group’s justification for this belief, on Tuomela’s account, depends
on the members having reasons to accept the belief as the belief of the
group.51 Thus, if the group believes W, and is justified in believing W, then
the group knows that W. Note that this analysis of group knowledge requires a proposition to be common knowledge amongst the group. Thus,
it is not sufficient for a group of individuals to happen to all know some
proposition at the same time, or even for each individual to accept this
proposition as the belief of the group. It is also necessary for the group to
49
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be aware that this proposition is accepted as the belief of the group by the
other members.
Assuming that this analysis of a group’s knowing a proposition (or some
other account) is plausible, we can see one way of giving a non-reductive
account of group know-how. On such an account, the members of an
orchestra must jointly accept some proposition, W, which provides a
way of performing some group action. For instance, what is needed for
a group to know-how to perform Beethoven’s Ninth is for each member
of the orchestra to know-how to perform her own instrument and for the
group to accept some proposition, W, which provides a way to perform
Beethoven’s Ninth. Whilst this proposal is reductive on the propositional
nature of know-how, it is non-reductive on the question of who the agent
of such knowledge is—the group is the subject that knows of W, that it is
the way to perform Beethoven’s Ninth, and, in virtue of this, the group
knows-how to perform that symphony.52 Note that on such an analysis,
what one individually knows is partly dependent on the role one plays in
the group. On Tuomela’s account of group belief, not everyone (or in some
cases no one) in the group personally believes p, but, rather, the operative
members determine the group’s belief, and the non-operative members
need only to accept this belief as the belief of the group. Thus, the account
appears helpful in capturing cases in which there is a variety of ways of
contributing to the group’s action. As long as an individual at least tacitly
accepts some way of acting, she can contribute to the group’s know-how,
regardless of her personal beliefs and personal contribution.
Note, however, that the intellectualist account of group know-how depends on there being some agreed way of performing which the group
knows propositionally since for the group to know that p, p must be
common knowledge to the group’s members. That is, not only must the
violinist know that p, and the cellist know that p, but also the violinist
must know that the cellist knows that p and that the cellist knows that the
violinist knows that p (and so on). This rules out the possibility of using
the intellectualist analysis to capture certain cases of group performance,
since it requires there to be some kind of agreement in place prior to acting.
Thus, certain kinds of improvised performance or group actions where
there is no prior agreement between individuals are difficult to capture
in intellectualist terms.53 This is not to say anything about the limitations
of reducing all instances of know-how to know-that. In the case of individual know-how, the intellectualist will surely insist that all instances
of know-how, regardless of how complex or how difficult to describe in
propositional terms, can be reducible to instances of knowledge-that.54 The
same cannot be said for group know-how, however. The reason for this is
that, for some proposition to be known by a group, the proposition has to
52

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 118.

53

Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 120.

54

Thanks to the editor for suggesting this objection.

Faith and Philosophy

46

be common knowledge to the members of the group and accepted as the
group’s belief by the relevant operative and non-operative members. This
requires there to be prior understanding of a proposition before the group
acts. Thus, in the case of improvised or spontaneous performance, whilst
it might be possible for each individual’s know-how to be summarized
propositionally (if intellectualism is true), it is not clear how the group’s
know-how could be known propositionally since there is no prior agreement between individuals that they will act in a certain way. The fact that
some group performance does not fit the intellectualist account well (and
as we will see in the next section, some aspects of group liturgical action
seem difficult to capture on the intellectualist account) provides some motivation for looking to non-intellectualist accounts of group know-how.
Secondly, then, it is possible to give an account of group know-how
which does not reduce know-how to propositional knowledge. I will
refer to this account as the “non-intellectualist account.” On this account,
“know-how is a form of disposition or ability, that belongs to an intelligent
agent, because, when manifested, not only can it be well regulated, but
also performed in a responsible manner.”55 Thus, assuming know-how is
not always reducible to know-that, we must provide an account of how
groups could be considered intelligent agents which have dispositions to
act in a certain way. Note again that whilst individuals within the group
are required to have certain kinds of know-how, what is required in addition to this is something about the group (a disposition to act in a certain
way in certain circumstances).
As with the literature on group belief, the literature on group agency
is considerable.56 Many of the positions developed in this literature seek
to give an account of how groups, constituted by individual members,
could be considered agents in their own right. Often, this requires taking
a certain functionalist stance on what it is to be an agent. For instance, as
Peter French describes it, agents must display a level of rationality (i.e.,
they must have a reason for acting), and they must be able to respond to
feedback and adjust their actions accordingly.57 Similarly, Christian List
and Philip Pettit suggest that an agent must have “representational states,
motivational states, and a capacity to act on their basis.”58 By examining
the decisionmaking processes of groups, whether that be through some
55
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hierarchical structure, a dictatorship, or an egalitarian voting process,
both French, and List and Pettit suggest that groups can meet the conditions for agency. Thus, if groups can be considered intelligent agents
capable of performing certain actions, we ought to consider them capable
of knowing-how to perform these actions.
Yet, whilst such accounts might provide some explanation of how
groups can be considered agents, as Tollefsen argues elsewhere, what
is lacking from such accounts is an explanation of how groups could be
regarded as having mental states and engaging in cognitive processes.59
Palermos and Tollefsen attempt to provide such an account by appealing
to the literature on distributed cognition. As they explain,
In order to claim that two (or more) systems give rise to some distributed
process and, thereby, to an overall distributed system . . . we need to establish that the contributing parts are non-linearly related to each other on the
basis of continuous reciprocal interactions between them. . . . in order to have
an overall distributed cognitive system—as opposed to merely several individual cognitive systems that are socially embedded . . . the requirement is
that the contributing members . . . collaboratively perform a cognitive task
by interacting continuously and reciprocally with each other.60

Put simply, an account of distributed cognition is required when the interactions between group members cannot be straightforwardly divided
into individual cognition. For instance, as we saw previously, an orchestra’s performing of a symphony is not merely a case of violin players
knowing-how to read the violin score and percussionists knowing-how
to read the percussion score—there must be a level of interaction and responsiveness to one another’s performance. On Palermos and Tollefsen’s
account, this kind of distributed cognitive system requires that “the
contributing members (i.e., the relevant cognitive agents) collaboratively
perform a cognitive task by interacting continuously and reciprocally
with each other.”61
It is important to note that not all behaviour which might potentially
be identified as cognitive in this way will meet the conditions for group
action. For instance, a random group of individuals might all individually
be proficient at playing jazz instruments, and happen, momentarily, to
play a piece of jazz music harmoniously.62 While such an example might
appear to be a case of group know-how, the reason that it should not be
considered as such, Palermos and Tollefsen suggest, is that “[t]he relevant behaviour needs to instead rise out of the cooperative and (thereby)
self-regulatory activity of some appropriate collection of units that will
allow it to be (at least potentially) regular behaviour.”63 Thus, they think,
59
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“in order for them to qualify as a jazz band, they must regularly be in tune
and in synch, and for that to be the case, every player’s performance must
be continuously interdependent to everyone else’s.”64
If groups are organised in the relevant way, it is possible that group
know-how might emerge. In contrast to a kind of reductive additive
account of group know-how, then, the non-reductive non-intellectualist
account holds that group know-how is an emergent property of groups
which have a certain functional role. On this account, group know-how
emerges,
[w]hen individual members coordinate on the basis of reciprocal interactions,
they adapt mutually to each other by restricting their actions in such a way
so as to reliably—that is, regularly—achieve ends that they would only luckily—if ever—bring about were they to act on their own. Via the application
of such positive mutual constrains, which result from, and further guide,
the members’ coordinated activity, new collective properties (i.e., regular
behaviors) emerge and the collective achieves a stable configuration that is
necessary for successful operation.65

Thus, just as the intellectualist account depends on providing some
plausible account of group knowledge, the non-intellectualist account
depends on providing some plausible account of distributed cognition.
Whilst filling out both of these positions is not within the scope of this
paper, the bare bones of both accounts should be sufficient to see how an
account of common ritual knowledge might develop.
Common Ritual Knowledge
We are now in a position to consider an account of group know-how
which can help fill out an account of common ritual knowledge.
As we have seen, there are reasons to suppose that liturgical worship
requires group actions for which there is a diversity of participants and
ways of participating. Furthermore, we have also seen that we should regard the community as the agent of the action of engaging God, and not
just the individual participants. Thus, if group know-how is truly non-reductive, then we must look to explain the nature of acting liturgically with
reference to a non-reductive account of group know-how. Let us consider
the possibility of such an application with reference to the two accounts
outlined above.
First, the application of an intellectualist account of group know-how,
according to which a group accepts some proposition as a way of acting,
has some promise in the context of liturgy. As Wolterstorff highlights,
the presence of a script in the context of group action allows for the
possibility of correct or incorrect performance of some group action, by
reference to how well a script is followed.66 In part, Wolterstorff notes,
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performing some group action correctly is a matter of suspending acting
on one’s own judgement “as to what would be good to do and instead
follow the script.”67 He continues, “[w]e are all, in fact, rule-submissive and
script-submissive selves; nobody is a purely autonomous self. We all act
heteronomously.”68
The kind of correctness rules which Wolterstorff refers to here can be
captured well by thinking of a church’s group know-how as a mutually
accepted way of acting. In the context of a sports team’s acting, for instance, this account appears to capture much of what it is to act together.
To be committed to a certain team with certain values is a commitment
to a certain way of playing. Playing for Manchester United, for instance,
might bring with it a commitment to playing attacking, fast-paced football
(although perhaps less so in recent seasons). Furthermore, following the
instructions of a coach in performing some maneuver on the pitch might
also be captured by commitment to a joint way of playing—for instance,
Jose Mourinho might specify that a free kick is to be taken in a certain way,
outlining the roles of each particular player. Performing this maneuver
correctly requires successfully adhering to Mourinho’s instructions. More
generally, as Palermos and Tollefsen describe, “team members need to be
explicitly committed to act as parts of the team, such that their behaviour
will mesh with the actions of the other members.”69
It is easy to see how this account might be extended to think about
acting together in following a liturgical script—in belonging to a church
or a particular tradition, we are committing to some particular way of
performing liturgy and thereby to some particular way of engaging God.
Moreover, as we have seen, commitment to worshipping together does
appear to require some explicit commitment to acting as part of a group.
The use of plural pronouns in a liturgical script (e.g., “We believe in God
the Father . . . ” is used in the recitation of the creed) is one example of
how the script reinforces our commitment to acting together in liturgy.70
Thus, assuming Tuomela’s (or some other plausible alternative) can capture a church’s knowledge of a proposition, then this account can provide
some explanation of what it is for a church to know-how to engage God
in worship.
If all that took place in group liturgical actions were following a script,
then the intellectualist account might suffice for an account of common
67
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ritual knowledge. But it is not all that takes place. As we have seen,
there are some actions which can’t be specified by the script, and a level
of liturgical improvisation and mutual responsiveness which is crucial
to acting together. Palermos and Tollefsen suggest that in the context of
acting together in a sports team, for instance, whilst there may be some
joint commitment to a way of playing which can be captured by a shared
commitment to a way of performing, this cannot capture all that the group
knows-how to do. They note that,
a number of studies also indicate that certain forms of joint action and . . .
[group know-how], such as interpersonal rhythmic coordination, can spontaneously emerge on the basis of dynamical process interaction—without
the further need, on the part of the individual members to take up any intellectualist commitments. . . . [Intellectualist commitments] prevent the
behaviour of the individual members of the team from deviating from the
individual behaviour that is required for the team to coordinate—or, perhaps somewhat more weakly, intellectualist commitments disallow team
members to engage in behaviour that would prevent the team from acting
in a sufficient coordinated manner.71

Their point, put simply, is that not all group actions require commitment
to a way of playing. Some group-level behavior emerges through repeated
performance without prior agreement. Yet, as we have seen the intellectualist account depends on there being prior agreement to some way of
acting. Moreover, even in cases in which such commitment already exists
(such as in sports teams), intellectualist commitments appear to function
as necessary requirements for group action, but not sufficient requirements. There is more to following Mourinho’s plan for enacting some new
maneuver in taking a free-kick than remembering all of the relevant instructions, and there is more to performing an orchestral symphony than
correctly reading one’s own part of the score and knowing that the group
is committed to playing the symphony in a certain way. Such commitments might provide helpful parameters to the group’s performance in
these two cases, but what is required for correctly performing both actions
is a mutual awareness of the relevant group members and an ability to
self-correct when things go wrong.
In the context of liturgy, the script can provide the correctness rules for
performing a certain liturgy, and a certain way of engaging God. Yet, if
there is some element of going beyond the script or improvising from the
script, then the intellectualist account won’t be sufficient for providing an
account of common ritual knowledge. The intellectualist account might
provide the necessary conditions for acting together, but it cannot provide the sufficient conditions. Thus, there is need to give an account of
the group cognition which arises from the complex engagement between
church members in liturgy, which cannot be reduced to a propositional
way of acting.
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In earlier work I have suggested that in thinking of the church’s actions in worship, we should appeal not only to the collective intentions of
church members, but also to how they might act as a group agent. Building
on the account of agency developed by List and Pettit (summarized in the
previous section), I noted that
the organizational structure of a church will depend, in part, on one’s tradition, but it seems clear that a member of a church, by participating in
the reading of liturgical scripts and singing hymns can act on behalf of the
group in a manner analogous to a member of a trade union acting on behalf
of a group by standing on a picket line. Note that these kinds of actions
might be performed through acts of . . . [collective intentionality], such as the
singing of the liturgical script, but we might also include many other actions
as instances of playing an active role in a group. Just as organizations need
both sub-committees and expert individuals to contribute to the actions of
the group, the individual actions of neuro-atypical individuals could rightly
be considered as playing an active role in the actions of the group.72

I then develop this account to suggest that, as long as one is licensed appropriately by the operative members of the group, one could contribute
to the church’s actions in a number of different ways. For instance, “in
the case of an individual with ASD who experiences a heightened spiritual awareness, such an individual might in turn lead other individuals
in the congregation to a heightened awareness of the presence of God,
and thereby, in turn, contribute to the collective actions of the group.”73
Thinking of the church as an agent which is capable of acting is helpful for
thinking about how the church might know-how to engage God.
Moving beyond an account of church agency, to thinking about a
church’s distributed cognition, we must suppose that in performing some
liturgical script, members coordinate their actions and mutually adapt to
one another’s actions to reliably produce ends. This kind of interaction is
not merely a matter of following instruction, but it also requires a kind of
responsiveness to how the other members of the congregation follow this
instruction. Thinking about the question of self-regulation will be helpful
here. In the case of a jazz band performing, for instance, “the drummer
could give visual or even verbal hints to the trombonist that he’s lost his
concentration and that he fails to follow the band’s rhythm, despite her
best attempts to ‘bring her back’.”74 In such a situation, so long as the
drummer is brought back into the rhythm of the band, the interactivity between the trombonist and the drummer allows the group to self-regulate
in such a way that it performs the piece correctly.
This kind of interactivity must take place within a church community
too. An excellent example of how this interactivity and self-correction
might take place (against the backdrop of a scripted way of performing)
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can be found in Benson’s description of his visit to Saint Gregory of Nyssa
Episcopal Church in San Francisco:
the service begins . . . with a prayer, some announcements, and yet another
welcome to everyone. Then the cantor . . . casually explains how the service
will go. He sings the melody of the first piece of music . . . giving the congregation a brief chance to practice and become comfortable with the music. . . .
Although there is a choir, the choir members are interspersed throughout
the congregation—which means that wherever you’re standing, nearby is a
good singer whom you can count on for help . . . after the service . . . those involved in the service disappear to spend five minutes discussing what went
well in the service and what could be improved . . . one remarkable thing
about the worship at Saint Gregory’s is that it feels so spontaneous. And yet
it is actually highly scripted. In other words, it achieves what less liturgical
churches often hope to achieve—a sense of openness, spontaneity, and lack
of formality, and the sense that the Holy Spirit is alive in guiding the worship. But it does so by very closely following a script, one that gets modified
on the basis of . . . short meetings after each service.75

As Benson highlights here, St Gregory’s engagement with God is both
scripted and spontaneous. They are committed to a way of acting and
engaging God which is made possible both by a written script, as well as
by the instructions of the cantor. But they are also involved in a complex,
higher-level group action in which members of the group are constantly
interacting with one another, allowing the group to self-regulate their actions in liturgy. This is achieved by strategic placement of the choir, which
helps the group to self-correct when members of the group veer from the
pitch of the group, but also by the reflection on the content and performance of the script in the short after service meetings. If Palermos and
Tollefsen are right, then the know-how that emerges in a context like this
is not reducible to what each individual knows, but it is only analyzable
by looking at the group’s performance.
Indeed, that acting together in liturgy requires more than a commitment
to a way of acting, can be observed by noting that worshipping as part of a
community is something which is acquired by repeated engagement and
not just by grasping some theoretical fact. As Smith puts this point, there
is a kind of irreducible “logic of practice” involved in being part of a ritual
community, which resists propositional reduction.76 He suggests that
natives—that is, practitioners, “unselfconsciously” embedded in a community of practice—are not primarily theorists. They are not “thinking” their
way through the world; they are not reflecting on what they’re doing—
which is precisely why any adequate interpretation of what’s going on in
such a community of practice will need to resist the temptation to construe
practitioners as implicit theorizers.77
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This seems right. Belonging to a liturgical community is something which
takes time and repeated practice. One way of describing why this is the
case is in reference to the kind of improvisation that takes place in liturgical
worship—as we have seen, performing a liturgy is not simply reciting a
script. In learning how to belong and act in such a community, one is also
learning to contribute to the group as an agent.
As Palermos and Tollefsen admit, many cases of group action will involve both a kind of intellectualist group know-how in which a group
accepts a proposition, and a kind of non-intellectualist group know-how
in which participation in a complex group interaction gives rise to emergent cognitive states. As we have seen, whilst a sports team’s commitment
to a certain way of playing might account, to some extent, for the group
know-how of the sports team, it cannot account for all aspects of the
group’s performance. Similarly, I have suggested, whilst a commitment
to a certain way of acting liturgically might partially capture what it is
for a church to know-how to engage God, it cannot capture this entirely.
What is required is an account of how individuals coordinate and interact
in such a way that the group functions as an agent, and thereby group
know-how emerges in the complex interactions of the group members. A
helpful way to summarize how these two accounts might interact can be
found in Underhill’s discussion of the tensions of “habit” and “attention”
in Christian worship:
Habit and attention must therefore co-operate in the life of worship; and it
is a function of cultus to maintain this vital partnership. Habit alone easily deteriorates into mechanical repetition, the besetting sin of the liturgical
mind. Attention alone means, in the end, intolerable strain. Each partner has
his weak point. Habit tends to routine and spiritual red-tape; the vice of the
institutionalist. Attention is apt to care for nothing but the experience of the
moment, and ignore the need of a stable practice, independent of personal
fluctuations; the vice of the individualist. Habit is a ritualist. Attention is a
pietist. But it is the beautiful combination of order and spontaneity, docility and freedom, living humbly—and therefore fully and freely—within the
agreed pattern of the cultus and not in defiance of it, which is the mark of a
genuine spiritual maturity and indeed the fine flower of a worshipping life.78

Conclusion
If ritual knowledge is acquired by means of an individual’s engaging God
by blessing, thanking and petitioning God, then common ritual knowledge
is acquired by means of a church’s engaging God by blessing, thanking
and petitioning God. To perform these liturgical actions together, we must
follow a script closely, but yet remain aware of the other members of the
community. If we wish to claim (as Wolterstorff does) that “[t]he church
blesses God, praises God, thanks God. . . . It’s not the individual members
who do these things simultaneously; it’s the assembled body that does
78
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these things,”79 then we need some account not only of ritual knowledge
but also of common ritual knowledge. If we are reductive about group
know-how, then it cannot be true that the church knows-how to worship
God but, rather, we have to admit, each individual member knows-how
to engage God, and together these acts constitute a church’s worship.
Such a reduction looks problematic for both theological and philosophical
reasons. Thus, as I have suggested, we should look to a non-reductive
account of group know-how.
On this account, the church knows-how to act by means of (i) its group
knowledge of some proposition which summarizes some way of acting
together in the liturgy, and (ii) its acting together to form a group agent
capable of emergent cognitive states and a disposition to engage God.
Acting together in this second way requires mutual awareness, as well as
an ability for the group to self-correct when its actions go wrong.
There is clearly much more work to be done both in social epistemology
and on the philosophy of liturgy. Much of what I have been exploring in
this article pushes at the limits of what analytic theology and philosophy
of religion has explored, and one notable area of silence from philosophers and analytic theologians is that of ecclesiology. If we want to say
that the Church engages God or that the Church knows-how to engage
God, then to properly advance the discussion of liturgy, we must think
more carefully about just what the Church is.80
University of St Andrews
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